Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 7

Issue 2

Article 14

4-1-1983

The Canadian Patient's Book of Rights: A Consumer's Guide to
Canadian Health Law
A. Bissett-Johnson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
A. Bissett-Johnson, “The Canadian Patient's Book of Rights: A Consumer's Guide to Canadian Health
Law”, Book Review of The Canadian Patient's Book of Rights: A Consumer's Guide to Canadian Health
Law by Lorne E. Rozovsky, (1982-1983) 7:2 DLJ 448.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Reviews
The Canadian Patient's Book of Rights: A Consumer's Guide to
CanadianHealth Law. By Lorne E. Rozovsky. Toronto: Doubleday
Canada Ltd., 1980.
Well qualified lawyers rarely take time to communicate important,
often vital, information to the general public about matters of law
which affect their lives and their health. This attractive handbook is a
welcome exception to that rule. One of Canada's best known and
most experienced lawyers in the medicolegal field, Lorne Rozovsky,
has written a "consumer's guide" of some 140 pages on the subject of
medical and hospital patient's rights under the laws. The area of law
covered is what the author calls "health law," one of the most exciting
and fastest growing of legal specialization fields in both Canada and
the United States.
This volume is Mr. Rozovsky's first attempt at reaching the public
directly to inform them about a great variety of legal issues in general
medical care, mental illness, and public health-communicable disease
control. At the outset, the author cautions his readership that his
book is not intended to replace the advice of a lawyer on a specific
question of health law where the particular circumstances and the
effects of local law must be considered. The book is intended rather
to alert interested people to their rights under the law, so that they are
not misled about what they can and cannot do when they are ill. Also,
to help them to ask the correct questions of both their medical
care-givers and their attorneys.
Rozovsky has succeeded in a task wherein many lawyers fail: He
has written briefly, in plain English, with a clear, uncomplicated
prose style. In so doing, I find few quarrels with him about his
explanations of the law he covers. Most of the book deals with
common law matters concerning medical treatment, medical malpractice, patient consent and refusal of treatment, and access to
hospital patient records. There are also useful explanations of areas
of statutory law such as abortion, mental illness hospitalization,
hospital insurance and medicare, and the definition of death.
Lay readers can begin at the beginning and read on through the
text, gaining greater sophistication with each section. The chapters
are organized in such a way that this approach is feasible and
interesting. Furthermore, the book can serve as a desk reference
where the reader can select particular topics for special instruction.
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The chapter headings are clear and unambiguous and there is a
two-page subject index at the rear of the volume.
The opening chapter considers the concept of a "patient's bill of
rights," a codification of legal entitlements in the health law field. The
author points out that there is no national or provincial law in
Canada known as a patient's bill or code of rights. Most of the
chapter is taken up in an analysis of the American Hospital Association's Patient's Bill of Rights adopted by the Association in 1973. The
principles of the AHA document provide a convenient and brief
summary of the common law rights of hospitalized patients. The
author's analysis does not indicate any specific disagreement in the
Canadian provinces with these principles. In the main, the author's
discussion deals with the practicality of carrying out these principles
in actual practice in acute-care hospitals.
The last section of the chapter contains a series of arguments
against a patient's bill of rights. A surprising amount of space is given
over to this exercise. It is not entirely clear to me whether the author
agrees with these arguments or not. However, no counter-balance of
reasons is given favoring such statements of hospital policy.
In his critique, Rozovsky opens with the rather severe statement
that, by developing a patient's bill of rights, "an entirely new atmosphere may be created in a hospital, an atmosphere that may harm the
relationship between the patient and the hospital" (emphasis supplied, p. 7). He goes on in the first of six "basic arguments" against the
bill of rights to assert: "The real problem is a lack of humanity, not a
lack of rights. That cannot be cured by rules" (p. 7).
I would agree with the author in his observation that the essential
key to patients' rights is humanity, the respect of all medical personnel for the individual human nature of each patient. It does seem,
however, that a hospital-adopted policy of respect for the rights and
the humanity of patients is a forward step. That is also the purpose of
law. Rules can encourage hospital personnel to afford patients the
respect and individual attention they deserve. Rules can also be the
basis for discipline of hospital personnel who violate the rights and
humanity of patients.
The author also asserts that a hospital-adopted bill of rights is
"useless" because the patient cannot enforce his rights while in the
hospital, where he or she is "at the mercy of the hospital staff." But the
purpose of the bill of rights is to provide hospital policy against just
such a circumstance. Doctors and nurses should be educated to
accept these rights of patients. In fact, the bill is perhaps most
effective as a part of a hospital's educational efforts. I am glad to say
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that the author accepts this idea in his own critique where he asserts,
"It would seem preferable to have a list of staff duties to patients. If
the hospital-patient or doctor-patient relationship is poor, it is the
hospital staff and doctors who need educating, not the patient." I
would agree that the patient's bill of rights can be viewed as an
expression of duties by the hospital care-givers. At the beginning of
this chapter, Mr. Rozovsky also acknowledges this point by observing, "Without the existence of a legal duty, there can be no right."
(page 1)
The second chapter contains important information for all Canadian citizens concerning entitlements to medical care and hospital
services under government health insurance plans. Eligibility is
explained in clear language. The description of benefits and restrictions on benefits is especially well prepared; in fact, it is the best
explanation I have seen on issues of coverage under the various
provincial plans. Mr. Rozov-sky has combined in a few pages a ready
reference to the common features in all the provinces, especially the
exemptions from coverage, and the problems of cross-province coverage for Canadians moving from onepart of the country to another.
The third chapter is also of particular importance for the exercise
of patient's rights in Canada. It deals with the issue of choice of
physician by patients. Canadian law in this chapter is evidently
affected by the health insurance systems in the various provinces. The
author states that Canadian patients do not have the right to be
treated by any particular doctor. The law concerning hospitals,
however, is changing. Many provinces have legislation giving the
right to patients to be admitted to particular hospitals if there is
accomodation for them on the recommendation of a member of the
medical staff. In Ontario, however, this right is restricted to Ontario
residents or dependents of residents, unless the person is suffering
from a life-threatening condition. The chapter also analyzes Canadian law on the privileges of physicians to practice in Canadian
hospitals.
The book contains a useful and practical analysis of the matter of
informed consent, or refusal, of medical treatment. In both Canada
and the United States this is an area of serious concern for both
patients and doctors. For patients, it is the fundamental principle
upon which is based their right to participation in medical decisions.
For doctors, it is the confusing stumbling block of malpractice
liability. As the author aptly observes, "no other topic in the field of
health law brings medicine and law into such clearly defined conflict"
(p. 28). The definition of "informed consent" is put forth quite well
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where the author asserts, "The patient must be told the nature and
risks of the treatment, of not having treatment, and of any alternative
treatment" (p. 34). He goes on to observe, however, that the doctor
need not provide the patient with a long and detailed medical lecture,
nor describe every conceivable risk. There is an interesting discussion
of unsolved problems in consent to treatment, such as with those
patients who are all too willing to consent and who do not want even
to hear about the details of treatment, along with those patients who
consent and seem to understand, but who later reveal their lack of
understanding to nursing staff on the hospital ward. Practical advice
is provided for hospitals in handling these issues. The chapter ends
with a suggested model form for obtaining consent for hospital
treatment and operations. The author observes that hospital admitting clerks may regard patient consent forms as mere formalities, but
that patients should never adopt this attitude. This is sound advice.
He instructs patients -wellin reading the forms and in their rights to
alter the documents or to add further restrictions to their consent.
Mr. Rozovsky makes an interesting statement also about the hospital's rights: He asserts that if the patient agrees to the procedure, but
refuses to sign the form, the hospital can refuse to allow the procedure to be performed in the hospital. This may be a correct statement
of the law, but I can't recall any American support for it. It does seem
basically reasonable that the hospital ought to be able to insist on a
signed consent form when the patient has indicated orally that he or
she wishes the procedure and has no objections or restrictions to
express. However, if the procedure is necessary and especially if there
would be danger to the patient in a delay or in a discharge, it might be
advisable to allow it to be performed without a signed form if the
attending surgeon or physican wants to go ahead and there are
witnesses to the oral consent. As the author points out, the consent
form is not the patient's consent but only evidence of that consent
(p. 47).
I found the chapter on abortion law in Canada especially enlightening. Most American lawyers are entirely unfamiliar with the fact
that Canadian law on illegal abortions is contained in the national
Criminal Code. An induced abortion is prohibited unless a certificate
is obtained from a hospital therapeutic abortion committee finding
that the continuation of the pregnancy would be likely to endanger
the life or health of the woman. The abortion must take place in the
hospital, it cannot be performed in a clinic or doctor's office. The
physician who performs the abortion cannot serve on the hospital
committee which approved the abortion. As a further safeguard, the
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law provides that no member of any hospital therapeutic abortion
committee is allowed to perform any abortions while a member of
the committee. Any abortion or attempted abortion performed
without a hospital certification is illegal in Canada and carries severe
punishment up to ife imprisonment. The pregnant woman involved
can also be charged with a crime if the certificate is not obtained.
The Criminal Code does not set forth procedural due process
requirements for hospital abortion committees. Mr. Rozovsky raises
some interesting questions about whether the patient, her attorney,
or her own physician have the right to appear before the committee
to present evidence, the right to written reasons for a refusal of
approval for an abortion, or even the right to know who is sitting on
the committee. The author asserts that there are no definite answers
to these questions since no patients have sought to enforce such rights
in the courts. He observes that in most cases the answer "will probabig be that the patent has n suzh lights' (p. S7). W'oevy, he also
indicates that some Canadian hospitals have adopted internal regulations on procedures to be followed by such committees, but he does
not indicate whether hospitals have afforded any of these procedural
rights to patients.
The chapter also deals with insurance payment for abortions.
Since therapeutic abortions can only be performed ifthe life or health
of the mother is endangered, it seems clear that the provincial
hospital and medicare insurance programs would cover medical
charges for the abortion as "medically necessary." The author asserts,
however, that the insurance authorities are not bound by the certification. They cant make their own detertninat'on as to whether the
abortion was medically necessary. He offers the example that the
committee may allow the abortion because another child may reduce
the stamina of the mother in caring for her other ten children, thus
endangering her health. The insurance authorities might disagree and
refuse to approve insurance coverage for the abortion services.
On a comparative basis, the current law on abortion in Canada is
very similar to the law in many American states prior to the early
1970s. In Massachusetts, my own jurisdiction, the law was almost
identical, even to the use of hospital abortion committees to provide
independent medical support for the attending physician's decision to
perform an abortion where there was a serious threat to the life or
health of the pregnant woman. This was due to an earlier Massachusetts criminal case where a physician had performed an abortion on
his own wife without a consultation from colleagues. There was no
national law on the subject in the United States. In the early 1970s a
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few American states, notably Colorado and New York, passed highly
liberalized abortion laws, putting political pressure on other states to
follow suit. Also, there were serious problems created by "quickie
abortion clinics" set up in the liberal states luring desperate women
and young girls to package tours to these clinics without adequate
medical follow up for later complications. The situation was becoming progressively worse when, in early 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court
moved in two cases to strike down most of the nation's state-level
abortion statutes by declaring the abortion decision of the pregnant
women (and her physician) to be a matter of personal privacy
protected by the national constitution, at least during the first two
trimesters of the pregnancy. The present conservative political shift in
the United States at the national level may bring with it some change
in the present legal situation.
As an American lawyer, I was also interested in the discussion of
matters of defining death and the treatment of persons who may
refuse life-supporting measures. Only Manitoba has passed legislation approving medical determinations of death due to irreversible
cessation of brain function. Mr. Rozovsky seems to speak disapprovingly of such legislation as unnecessarily tying physicians' hands. He
concludes, "One wonders why we should train physicians to exercise
judgment in these matters if a legislature is to do it for them" (p. 15).
In the United States, a number of states have passed brain death
statutes and we also have a Uniform Act prepared by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The effort in
all of these laws, including the Uniform Act, has been to leave the
actual criteria for determining brain death, or any other form of
death, to accepted medical standards. The law provides only that this
type of death can be applied on the doctor's medical judgment.
There have apparently been no decisions in Canada similar to the
recent rash of cases in the American states on patient refusal of
treatment or on court-ordered treatment of incompetent persons
who may die if not treated. Mr. Rozovsky's discussion of these issues
is thoughtful and complete in only a few pages. He observes that
where a dying patient is not mentally competent, physicians are in no
position to make judgments about whether someone else would
accept life as it is, or the quality of that life, rather than death.
Physicians should therefore concentrate upon preserving life. He
concludes that the decision to discontinueftreatment is not a legalistic
one but is "more a matter of consensus between the physicians and
the family" (p. 107). This is a sensible and practical statement, and it
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was largely the accepted view of the law in the United States until
recent years.
So-called "living wills" are examined in the text. No Canadian
provinces have passed laws making such documents legally effective
as have several American states, with more jurisdictions being added
each year. Mr. Rozovsky observes that it may be doubtful that
Canadian provinces can deal with this area since the Criminal Code is
a matter of federal law. In the United States, one of the objectives of
these laws has been to remove any threat of civil as well as criminal
liability from any physician who stopped treatment of a patient
under the instruction of a living-will document. The living-will laws
in the United States do not, however, allow physicians to take active
steps to end a patient's life. There is a considerable controversy about
what is meant in these laws about ending treatment. Most of the
provisions speak of ending "extraordinary care," or "heroic measures," or "being kept alive by artifical means" Just what these terms
mean in any given clinical situation is not very clear in the statutes.
The few field studies done in the United States as yet do not indicate
any widespread use of the documents by patients in states that have
already adopted the laws. It would seem, however, that such legislation can be helpful to patients' efforts to have their own wishes
followed rather than leaving the matter in the hands of available
family and treating physicians. It is probable that no living will
document should be considered in evaluating the patient's wishes if it
is over five years old. Such legislation has generally been opposed by
"right to life" groups (or anti-abortion groups) and sponsored by
Euthanasia Societies and other "pro choice" patient advocacy
organizations.
The concluding pages of this text contain lists of addresses of
major public authorities and private medical groups to whom complaints about medical and hospital clinical services and financial
problems can be addressed throughout Canada. The lists are preceded by a brief chapter describing where complaints of different
types can be handled under Canadian law.
There is no doubt but that this handbook can be invaluable and
worth its small initial cost for concerned consumers of health care.
More than that, however, it has other uses. The text can serve as an
excellent introductory monograph on health law for health care
providers, particularly those functioning in hospitals. I would also
suggest it as an inexpensive background textbook and reference
work for law students taking courses in health law in Candian law
schools. I can make these recommendations confidently because of
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the admirably even-handed manner of Mr. Rozovsky's approach to
his subject. He is not at all as strident in his advocacy of a singleminded consumer viewpoint as many other legal commentators in
similar texts in this field, especially in the United States. When in
doubt, when the law is not clear, Mr. Rozovsky admits it clearly.
When he believes, from his experience, that no legally enforceable
right exists for the patient, even if it should, he does not hesitate to
state that the right does not exist. Some examples of this style of
writing have been cited in this review. Also, some of the subject
matter in the book is actually at least as directly relevant for provider's rights and attorney guidance as it is for the average consumer
patient. This would include, for example, the discussion of physicians' rights to staff privilages in hospitals, the coverage of hospital
responsibility for physician and nurse errors, the "borrowed servant
rule," and other technical areas of malpractice defense. It would also
include much of the analysis in the chapter on informed consent
where, as noted earlier, the author's advice is particularly helpful to
hospitals and doctors in dealing with unsolved problems in this area,
developing model patient consent forms, and advising on the content
of effective informed consent statements which will protect hospitals
and physicians from unwarranted law suits. The text also supplies
references to "additional readings" after each chapter which should
be particularly useful to health care providers, law students, and
lawyers. Mr. Rozovsky cites authorities separately for Canadian,
English, and American law. In the Canadian field, he cites authoritative government reports and Royal Commission documents that
might not otherwise come to the attention of such readers, even those
familiar with the use of a law library. Mr. Rozovsky also cites similar
government reports from the United States such as the Report of the
Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice, and Westin's
government report on privacy and citizen's rights of access to health
records and computerized medical and hospital data. These reports
have been without doubt the most important documents on their
subjects over the past ten years.
In summary, it would seem clear that Lorne Rozovsky has produced even more than he has promised. He has provided a highly
useful introductory text on health law in Canada, not only for
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patients, but for heilth care providers and attorneys interested in this
important field of the law.
William J. Curran
Professor of Legal Medicine
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
The Practiceof Freedom: CanadianEssays on Htman Rights and
FundamentalFreedoms. Edited by R. St.J. Macdonald and John P.
Humphrey. Toronto: Butterworths 1979. Pp. xx, 460. Price: $21.95
(paper)
This Macdonald/ Humphrey collaboration is the result of an innovative experiment; they have sought out and brought together, in a
single volume, articles written by individuals whose particular areas
of interest and expertise might never otherwise have been afildiated.
The law teaching profession constitutes the body from which the
largest number of contributors (17 of 26) are drawn. However, unlike
most collections of essays, the area of academic concentration of the
contributors is not a limited one; it extends from the study of
domestic criminal law and procedure to the study of public international law. Further, even among the group of legal scholars who have
contributed to the book, a number of individuals bring to bear upon
their writings the experience of other occupational qualification (e.g.
Doyen Gerald A. Beaudoin was Assistant Parliamentary Counsel of
the House of Commons, Professeur Henri Brun is the Director
G&u~sal des Aijaiimes, Cii.\s at Pin-als, Mim t+,e idt la 3usC-, du
Quebec, and Professor Alan Grant, was a Constable who rose to the
rank of Chief Inspector of the Metropolitan Police of London,
England). In addition, the remaining contributors possess occupational credentials which often have little, if any affiliation with law
teaching; some are legal practitioners, others are political scientists,
and yet others are civil servants orjournalists. Together, their collective observations provide for the reader an introduction to the study
of Canadian human rights and freedoms which attempts to transcend
the more narrow approach taken by texts of edited articles, whose
authors are usually drawn from a single area of study and expertise.
At the end of the five page Inttroduction to the teyt, the editors
have stated that the purposes of it are fourfold: (1) to "contribute to
the organization of the study of and practice of human rights law"; (2)
to encourage "the necessary idea that we should study society by
seeing what men make of it rather than what it makes of them"; (3) to
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"stimulate discussion of our fundamental values in the late twentieth
century"; and (4) to "provide a convenient source book for lawyers
and laymen". The act of gathering together the material from the
various contributors fulfills the first of the editors' purposes, for (in
Canada, at least) as both the study and the practice of human rights
law is in its infancy, so too is a collection of published material which
attempts to define and elucidate that area of legal study. The Practice
of Freedom is a text which begins to fill the need for a body of
Canadian literature on the subject.
The nature of the second and third goals set by Professors Macdonald and Humphrey is such that it is difficult to determine whether
they have been met by the contents of the book. However, although
opinions may differ, the least one can say is that an attempt has been
made to collect writings which promulgate a diverse number of
viewpoints. For example, Professor Smiley's contribution ("Rights,
Power and Values in Canadian Society") the political scientists'
observation, that human rights are, in essence, the "demands of
human dignity". As such, they "are conditioned by time, place and
circumstances" and differ according to the needs of the particular
individual. With this in mind, his concept of institutional mechanisms is noteworthy - particularly in light of the recent federal/ provincial accord on the constitution:
As we should be less dogmatic in our formulation of what rights are
to be protected, and in the ranking of such rights, so we should be
experimental and tentative in our approach to the most useful institutional mechanisms for the protection of human rights. The superficial
argument put forward by the federal government a few years ago for a
Canadian Charter of Human Rights seem to imply that rights were
self-enforcing if they were "guaranteed" by way of entrenchment in
the Constitution...
I have elsewhere argued against the further entrenchment of human
rights in the Canadian Constitution. Much of this debate revolves
around the relative institutional capacities of courts and legislatures
in the definition and protection of rights. But in another dimension
the argument for entrenchment is founded on arrogance: we are
willing to impose our present-day formulation of human rights on
future generations....There is profound wisdom in the single restriction on parliamentary sovereignty that no legislature can bind its
successors. The proponents of entrenchment disregard this wisdom.
(pp. 3-4)
Mr. James Leavy's article, "The Structure of the Law of Human
Rights", reaches a different conclusion. With the eye of the seasoned
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legal practitioner he examines Canadian constitutional rights, traditional legal rights and remedies, human rights legislation and international human rights obligations of the state, and weighs them against
the increasing legislative and regulatory involvemerit in peoples' lives,
"the changed situation of Parliament, the more pervasive complex
nature of the state, the difficulty of organizing public opinion in the
defence of fundamental rights, and the possibility that parliament
will reflect an intolerant or oppressive public opinion" (p. 72). His
final analysis is in accord with a movement in the United Kingdom
supported by jurists such as Lord Hailsham and Lord Justice Scarman - that a charter of human rights be written into the constitution:
An entrenched bill of rights would give the courts much more power
than they now possess, since they would not be merely interpreting
legislation or deciding on the constitutionality in the technical jurisdictional sense, but also assessing the conformity of the laws and their
appficafion to a fixtd standard. In ont stnst tht 5ndgt%'wiudld bt
"making law" since by repealing laws contrary to an entrenched bill of
rights they would uphold the law as it stood before the impuned
statute was adopted. However, it is probably more accurate to say
that in reviewing legislation they would be exercising the purely
judicial function of interpreting the provisions of the fundamental law
to which the state itself is subject and which could only be changed
with the consent of the people. Such an entrenched bill contained in a
supreme, written constitution would mark a distinct break with the
notion of parliamentary supremacy, which has formed the basis of
the "British Constitution since 1688 and of the Canadian Confederation since its beginnings. (p. 73)
Professor Grants contribution, "The Police: Organization, Personnel and Problems", adds a different nuance to the notion of
studying society "by seeing what men make of it rather than what it
makes of them". He provides a basic outline of the internal administrative and operational workings and problems of police forces. In so
doing, the reader is provided with a rare glimpse of the administrator's view of a law enforcement agency. Professor Grant's article
concerns itself primarily with the development of the quality of a
police force and with the work it can do, and he leaves references to
human rights and fundamental freedoms to the mind of the reader.
After examining this chapter of the text, one questions whether the
job conditions of law enforcement ofka'als permit them to address
themselves to human rights concerns. Further, upon becoming
aware of the legal and organizational burdens under which police
officers must operate, and considering what the public expects them

The Practice of Freedom 459

to do, one's mind is directed to the third goal of the editors of the
book: we begin to question "our fundamental values in the twentieth
century".
Although every article in the text contributes, in varying degrees,
to the first three goals set by the editors, the primary purpose of most
are directed toward the fourth: the compilation of a source book. To
that extent, virutally no subsection is left untouched and one encounters comments on every human rights and fundamental freedoms
issue from the standard topics (e.g., administrative fairness, rights of
women, the rights of the institutionalized, the rights of native people)
to those not normally associated with them (e.g., the Law Reform
Commission, the TV Ombudsman). However, a problem which
frequently arises with such collection is manifested in this one; the
number of contributors is so great that the standards of the articles
vary considerably. For example, like the chapter written by Professor
Grant, the ones by Professors Barnes ("the Law Reform Commission") and Friedmann ("the Ombudsman") deal with the functions
and activities of their subject matter in a manner that relates only
tangentially to human rights and fundamental freedoms, while the
contribution by Mr. Sloan on "Freedom of Information", though
stimulating, has not enough references to give an interested reader a
beginning point from which to continue the study of the subject
matter. By contrast, Professor Gibson's article on the "Legal Protections of Privacy" provides a good general overview of the topic, as
does Professor Hunter's ("The Origin, Development and Interpretation of Human Rights Legislation") with its criticism of good intentions and its detailed examination of some of the work of human
rights commissions and some of the case law on the subject. The
contributions by Doyen Beaudoin ("Linguistic Rights in Canada")
and Mr. Yalden ("The Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages") appear to be quite good, but their topics deal with such a
vital area of concern to Canadians that a reader is left with the feeling
that far more could be said. Similarly, the article by Professor Marx
on "Human Rights and Emergency Powers" proves to be so interesting that it was a disappointment to discover that it continued for but
a brief thirteen pages.
Donald J. Fleming
Assistant Professor of Law
University of New Brunswick
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Towards a ConstitutionalCharterfor Canada.By Albert S. Abel.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980. Pp. 105. Price: $7.50.
"Reform the Constitution" has been the cry of many Canadian
scholars and politicians for years. None however hiad ever individually attempted to formulate recommendations for such major constitutional changes as Professor Albert Abel was considering before his
death. He was not content merely to add his voice to the clamour, but
was prepared to articulate proposals for change, even though he was
fully aware that they would be met with a great deal of opposition.
Unfortunately, he died before his proposals were completed so what
is offered is merely the foundations of his proposed reform constitution for Canada.
Economic matters are the central focus of his published proposals,
and Abel's starting premise is that the federal legislature should have
the power to deal with matters that affect the economy of Canada as
proposals would strengthen the economic powers of the
a whole. -is
federal legislature, but at the same time would allocate important
responsibilities to the provinces in other areas. Professor Abel
believes that the present B.N.A. Act permitted the erosion of the
powers of the provinces while federal power was enhanced. In order
to ensure that Canada remains a true federation this growing imbalance has to be remedied.
Before making his recommendations Professor Abel examines
similar provisions in the American and Australian constitutions to
ascertain if either of them would provide a satisfactory model for a
reformed Canadian constitution. His conclusions are primarily that
-noother (,onsition is a sa famo y mod.t bta.st f tht dfi'itncies found to exist in their provisions, plus the significant factor that
Canada is uniquely different and must evolve its own model. His
examination, which he shares with the reader, is very useful, however, since he shows why these similar provisions have not been
successful or why they would not be appropriate in a Canadian
setting.
An essential part of his reform package is a reversal of the current
premise in the B.N.A. Act that the residual power should be vested in
the federal legislature. This he views as the vehicle which has often
been used to subordinate the position of the provinces. In his reform
constitution the provinces woutd be gven the residual. power in a
clause that would give them the power to make laws operative within
the province with respect to anything not assigned to Parliament. In
this area he examines in detail the American and Australian constitutions and concludes that although the states in both countries are by
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the wording of their constitution assigned the residual powers, in
practise the federal state has consistently encroached upon these
powers. Part of the problem has been the use of terminology giving
the federal legislatures annexed incidental powers because the courts
have tended in the past to interpret these very liberally in favour of
the federal legislatures. As a result Professor Abel exhorts draftsmen
to make it very clear that the residual power lies with the provinces
and to make no mention of federal powers other than those specifically enumerated. This list should also be sparse and specific.
One possible ramification of this proposed reversal of residual
power is not dealt with. Would the federal legislature be able to deal
effectively with a crisis outside the economic sphere? How would
Abel ensure that the federal government had adequate powers and at
the same time ensure that they are only used in times of genuine
crisis? Is the court an effective body to police this? It seems that Albert
Abel had doubts that it was, since he stressed that there should be no
mention of federal incidental powers to remove the temptation from
the courts to interpret such provisions in favour of the federal
legislatures.
After considering the residuary power Abel then turns to the
taxing and spending powers. His initial taxation proposals are
neither controversial nor new. He recommends that the provinces
should have the power to raise money by any mode of taxation
except duties or imports, subject to the limitation that these laws are
operative within the province. This chapter is unnecessarily long
since his proposals are not complex.
The following two chapters raise a question of constant concern
under the present constitutional position, and offer an unusual solution. For a number of years the provinces have been concerned about
the unbridled use of the federal spending power. In many cases it has
forced them to establish priorities that they may not have chosen on
their own but the offer of money from the federal government was
very difficult to refuse. Major problems have arisen when the federal
government encouraged the provinces to establish programmes such
as medicare, and then proposed to withdraw its monetary support at
a later date. A province is then left scrambling to find the money to
continue the programmes since in most instances a demand for and
reliance upon the existence of such programmes has been created.
The new proposals would ensure that federal monies were only used
for carrying out laws "in effectuation of the powers granted to or
recognized in the federal government by this constitution" unless the
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provinces unanimously agree to the spending or Abel's proposed
Canadian equalization council recommended it.
This council will undoubtedly not receive a warm welcome from
government officials since it is to be an independent body created to
allocate some of the federal monies to the provinces using a form of
equalization which Abel believes to be more equitable that that used
in the past. What is most unusual about his proposal is that this
equalization council would be independent from both levels of
government, its members designated by each province and the federal government, but not subject to their direction. A fund would be
established from net proceeds of duties on import and federal
revenues in excess of expenditures in execution of federal purposes.
The money collected would then be allocated among the provinces
to the "end that the resources of each may be such that it can provide
government services at a level worthy of Canadian life." These would
be unconditional grants to be used as the province so desires. Traditionally these grants have been worked out by a process of political
bargaining which Abel feels has not been a satisfactory method since
only the strongest voices tended to have their demands and expectations met. He does not see this as problematic for the principles or
notions of parliamentary responsibility since it would be elected
legislatures who appointed the members of the council. However,
this council would not be accountable to the legislatures - in fact if
they have a protected term of office they would be allocating money
without being accountable to anyone. While politicians would
undoubtedly oppose this move, it is also questionable whether this
would be satisfactory for a democratic system. Is there not some
merit in allowing politicians to make these decisions as to allocation
of public resources since they are the ones who should be responsible
if this money is not allocated in a satisfactory manner?
On the whole Professor Abel's proposals are a very admirable
attempt to resolve some of Canada's constitutional problems. It is
truly unfortunate that he did not complete his book before he died,
since some of the future chapters left undone were designed to fill in
loopholes in earlier chapters. However, even in these few well written
and researched chapters he has provided valuable insights for constitutional reform, and provided encouragement by his bold example
for those who would venture into this crucially important area.
Clare Beckton
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University
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Report on CivilLitigation in the PublicInterest. By the Law Reform
Commission of British Columbia. Vancouver: Ministry of Attorney
General, 1980, Pp. 80 (No price given)
In the context of contemporary society, our traditional rules of
standing seem peculiar. They tell us that the more people affected by
a wrongful act, the less likely it is that any citizen will be able to
maintain a law suit seeking redress. That narrow circle of persons
with a pecuniary or proprietary interest will be able to pursue their
private interests, but what of the broader public interest when others
are as well affected? In the infamous Hickey et. al.v. ElectricReduction Co. of Canada,Ltd.I case, even fishermen whose livelihood had
been affected when fish became contaminated by the discharge of
poisonous materials were told that they did not have the requisite
locus standi to sue. This was so because the offending action also
affected the rest of the public and hence constituted a public rather
than a private nuisance. Only if they had suffered "peculiar damage"
could they sue. If this is the reaction commerical fishermen receive,
imagine the reaction awaiting a public-spirited citizen; imagine the
reaction an environmental defence group would receive!
The Courts have traditionally told us that these are not cases of
wrongs without remedies. There is a remedy for public nuisance, just
as there is where a public body exceeds its powers and where statutory provisions enacted for the benefit or protection of the public are
breached. In each of these instances the Attorney General has standing to seek an injunction or declaration. He is regarded as responsible
for the protection of the public interest and the Courts have been
content to assume that if the public interest is really affected, he will
act. The problem is that often he does not act, in which case the
exercise of his discretion is unreviewable and the Courts will not, with
limited exceptions, allow a substitute advocate of the public interest.
In that sense a wrong can go without a remedy. In these days of
expanding statutory norms of conduct and public duties, it is not
surprising that an Attorney General cannot give full attention to all
such violations. Often, however, there are persons and groups willing
and able to place these matters before the Courts for adjudication.
Why not by-pass procedural concerns and allow the Courts to decide
issues which affect the public interest on their merits?
It is in this kind of context that the Law Reform Commission of
British Columbia has recommended the enactment of legislation

1. (1970), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 368 (Nfld. S.C.).
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expanding the role of citizens in maintaining public interest proceedings. 2 Such proceedings are defined as those which could be brought
by the Attorney General, and include specifically proceedings in
respect of a public nuisance, a violation of an enactment, and an
action by a public body in excess of its powers. The Commission
would require a person wishing to maintain a public interest proceeding to apply as usual to the Attorney General, requesting him to
commence the proceeding himself or to consent to a relator action. If
the Attorney General does not respond favourably within ten days,
the applicant can apply to the Supreme Court for consent to undertake the proceeding in his own name. The Court "on conditions it
considers appropriate, shall give its consent unless it considers there is
not ajusticiable issue to be tried". 3 An amendment to the Constitutional Questions Act 4 is also suggested to permit any person to seek a
declaration that an enactment of the Province or of Canada is
"invalid". This would seem to eliminate consideration of prelitigation conditions precedent, 5 and to remove from the Court the
discretion residing in it as to whether standing ought to be accorded
in such cases.
These recommendations are significant. Their incorporation into
Canadian legal systems would represent, in my view, one of the most
important innovations in a good many years. Such legislative
changes would go quite some distance in enhancing public participation in our legal system and would put real teeth into many of the
laudatory but largely platitudinous statements found in modern
legislative schemes. However, this Report has more to recommend
itself to the reader's attention than just its introduction into the
fascinating possibilities unfolding in British Columbia.
It will be a number of years, if at all, one suspects, before these
recommendations are widely acted upon. In the meantime, lawyers
acting for public interest oriented clients will continue to be confronted with questions of standing and will be in need of information
and arguments concerning them. The Report serves admirably as a

2. This they suggest should be done by adding new sections to the Law andEquity Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 224.
3. At 75.
4. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 63.
5. Eg. in Nova Scotia Board of Censorsv. McNeil(1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 632 (S.C.C.)
Laskin, C.J. noted at 635 that the plaintiff had taken "all the steps that he could
reasonably be required to take in order to make the question of his standing ripe for
consideration."
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statement of law as well as a source of critical comment concerning
the need to push the Thorson and McNeilfrontiers6 further forward.
The Report essentially consists of four segments. The first segment
discusses the position of the Attorney General, relator actions, the
Attorney Generals fiat and the standing of the Attorney General in
three types of action: public nuisance, the excessive use of power by a
public body and the breach of statutory provisions. The three chapters devoted to the role of this public official are followed by a chapter
dealing with the standing of an individual.
This chapter begins with the proposition that an individual will
have standing in a matter of public interest only if a private right of
his has been interfered with or he has suffered special damage
peculiar to himself from the interference with a public right. Statutory appeals are next examined, under headings coinciding with the
terms of art usually used, i.e., "person aggrieved", "person interested", "person dissatisfied", and "person affected". The next section
of the chapter deals with the exceptions to the above-mentioned
proposition, namely ratepayers cases, constitutional cases and
express statutory exceptions. The type of remedy sought by an
individual is sometimes a pertinent factor in decisions on standing,
and this is examined in the penultimate section. Finally, the chapter
on individual standing is rounded out by consideration of private
prosecutions and intervention as amicus curiae.It is this chapter on
individual standing that the busy practitioner will find most useful as
an up-to-date statement of the law. This is particularly so since
English and Canadian, as opposed to purely British Columbian,
authorities are canvassed.
The third segment of the Report discusses the Commission's
perceived "Need for Reform" of the present law. It argues persuasively in favour of relaxing standing requirements, discussing the
arguments usually advanced in favour of the traditional rules. It
reviews the literature on the subject, including the work of such other
law reform commissions as the English and the Australian. The final
segment to the Report puts forward the Commission's recommendations for reform, which take the form already outlined above.

6. Thorson v. Attorney-Generalof Canadaet. al.(1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) and
McNeil,supranote 5 both involved challenges to the constitutionality of legislation. It is
still an open question as to whether the liberalized views represented by these two cases
will be expanded to non-constitutional areas. See the discussion in the Report, at 42-50
and the comment of the Honourable Wishart Spence in Water and Environmental Law
(Halifax: Dalhousie Law School, 1979).
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From a reviewer's standpoint, 7 there is little in this Report to draw
negative comment. 8 The prose is lucid; the complexions of the present state of the law are set out in understandable form; the layout is
professional; the quality of print and binding suitable for permanent
collections. 9 The research has been thorough and citations indicate
sources of other useful material. In short this is one report which is a
"must" for anyone interested in the subject.
Bruce H. Wildsmith
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University
Child Support in America: The Legal Perspective. By Harry D.
Krause. Virginia: The Michie Company, 1981. Pp. 700. Price: $30.00
(U.S.)
Canadians will view as little short of miraculous, the ability of the
publishers to market this hard cover book at a price of $30.00 U.S.
The ten chapters cover:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii) & (viii)
(ix)

Child Support Obligations Under State Law
Enforcement Remedies under State Law
Legitimacy and Illegitimacy
The New Law of Illegitimacy
Ascertaining the father of the non-marital child
Blood tests and science
Federal intervention in child support
The mother's cooperation in ascertaining and locating the
absent father
(x) Discuss the direction in which Child Support might
develop in the next five years.
In addition to the above there are 8 appendices covering, interalia
reciprocal enforcement of support legislation, the Uniform Parentage Act and a number of papers on blood tests and the use of blood
tests in other countries, and the capacity of U.S. laboratories for
blood typing.
7. The purpose of this review is not to examine critically the substance ofthe recommendations. Suffice it to say in that respect that I endorse the direction recommended by the

Commission.
8. A few defects in the footnotes did come to my attention, e.g., note 36 at 35 should be
"Nfld. S.C." instad of "N.S.S.C." and should be dated 1970 instead of 1972; note 30 at 34
should be "McLaren" instead of "McClaren".
9. It would have been useful to have put the title along the back of the binding to ease
retrieval after shelving.
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For those familiar with the problems of child support in Canada
there may be some reassurance in the fact that the United States has
faced similar problems, though until recently' we lacked some of the
empirical research which has been done there. In the United States
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection add
an extra dimension and have led to support obligations being equally
imposed on both parents of illegitimate children (p. 5). In Canada
much the same result has been reached, for example, by recent
legislative amendments 2 to the Nova Scotia Family Maintenance
Act.
In addition to the flexible tests commonly found in Canada for
arriving at the quantum of child support, Canadians may find interesting some of the Tables of Support in use in some of the American
courts. (See p. 13 for the Beoward County Court Schedule). Canadians will also find the Parent Location Service discussed at pages
330-339 and 424-427 of great interest. This federally funded programme set up under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children is
not restricted to cases where public aid is being provided to children,
and enables statutorily authorized state and federal Parent Location
Services to trace the defaulting parent. The initial search is at the local
and state level.
At the state level, these sources include employment, unemployment,
public assistance, income tax and motor vehicle offices, as well as
criminal-record repositories. At the local level, sources include personnel of state or local assistance, food stamp and social services
programs, relatives, friends and past employers of the absent parent,
financialrefeyences, the telephone company and post office, as wenl as
police, union and fraternal organization records.
Subsequently a federal search may be made covering the following
sources by means of a computer search:

1. See MatrimonialSupport Failures:Reasons, ProfilesandPerceptionsof Individuals
Involved (Alberta: Institute of Law Research and Reform, 1981). This study was based
on research in Alberta. Fora recent study of Maintenance Orders in the Vancouver area
see "A. Wachtel and B. Burtch, "Excuses"-An Analysis of Court Interaction in Show
Cause Enforcement of Maintenance Orders (Vancouver United Way of the Lower
mziad, 19mi).

2. See the Nova Scotia Family Maintenance Act, S.N.S. 1980, c. 6 where s. 8 involving
maintenance of children seems to overlap with s. II which covers maintenance of
illegitimate children. The net result of these opaque provisions may be to achieve in Nova
Scotia much of the same result as the more direct approach in Ontario of abolishing the
legal distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy in the Children's Law Reform Act,
S.O. 1977, c. 41, s. 1.
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Under this system, the federal parent locator service compiles all
search requests and, once weekly, disseminates all requests to the

Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the
Veterans Administration, the Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation (Coast Guard), the National Personnel
Records Center, the General Services Administration, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. These agencies report the results
of their internal searches to the federal parent locator service, which
updates its answers to state requests as information from the federal
agencies' searches come in.
This contrasts strongly with the Canadian position. Although
some provinces such as Nova Scotia have made provincial data bases
available to those wishing to trace a defaulting payer parent or
spouse, 3 these do not bind the Crown in right of Canada, which,
through its Income Tax, U.I.C. and other data bases has a much
more extensive means of tracing defaulters. Quebec, however, unlike

the other provinces, is in'the position of being able to have rcoume to
its own income tax returns and moreover has amended its laws to
require persons in Quebec, such as provincial tax authorities, or even
the relatives of an absconding parent or spouse, to reveal their
whereabouts in order to facilitate enforcement of existing courts
orders. 4 Where out of Province orders are concerned there is no
doubt that the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance legislation
leaves a great deal to be desired. Only Manitoba 5 makes a real effort
3. Nova Scotia Family Maintenance Act, S.N.S. 1980, c. 6, s. 51.
4. See Bill 183, 1980. An Act to promote the payment of support which adds anew article
546.1 to the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure.
5. See the position paper by R. M. Diamond of the Manitoba Attorney General's
Department presented at the 2nd C.B.A. in Montreal August 28, 1980. The following
extract indicates the basic Manitoba position.
The Department of the Attorney-General for the Province of Manitoba provides
Crown Counsel in cases of child abduction to represent custodial parents in the civil
enforcement of foreign custody orders pursuant to either the Extra Provincial Custody Orders Enforcement Act or Section 15 of The Divorce Act.
It is the opinion of the Manitoba Department of the Attorney-General, that for the
Extra ProvincialCustody Orders EnforcementAct and for Section 15 of The Divorce
Act as it effects foreign Custody Orders to have any real effect, it is necessary for the
Attorney-General's Department to provide legal counsel in such situations.
As a result, on March 14th, 1979 the Department wrote to the Deputy AttorneysGeneral of the other Provinces in Canada setting out ourrule and requested that they

PT-hta sirl;1kay strvt%. Thitt p~wn.l)tt% itdt
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ignored the requests to date.
Despite the lack of reponse by the other Provinces, our Department does provide legal
counsel to custodial parents where the non-custodial parent abducts the child into
Manitoba for purposes of enforcing Foreign Custody Orders. Our Department has
taken the position that this is a logical extension of the legal services provided by our
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to provide personnel to assist the recipient of an out of Province
maintenance or custody order to enforce it in the Province where the
payer is. Clearly the advent of a parent location service on the
American model would be of great benefit. It would equally facilitate
the enforcement of support orders under the Divorce Act. Although
these are enforceable throughout Canada once they have been registered, they presuppose the recipient of the award knows where the
payer spouse or parent is located. Recent research from Alberta 6 has
shown that finding defaulting payers (usually husbands and fathers)
does not require extensive detective skills and the creation of such a
system has a great deal to commend it. Fears of encroachment of the
civil liberties of the defaulter have to be set against the rights of
children (and spouses) to support and not to be left in destitution.
One salutary lesson, however, despite the virtues of the American
system, is anecdotal evidence of the several reliable sources at the
recent National Workshop on Child Support 7 that it is still possible
for defaulting fathers to disappear in Cook County notwithstanding
the virtues of the U.S. Parent Location Services.
Once a parent has been located in the U.S.A. Krause shows how
various novel methods of enforcement of arrears have been employed,
including deducting arrears from tax refunds due to the defaulting
parent. These contrasts nicely with the more robust methods of
enforcement so graphically described by David Chambers in "Making Fathers Pay".

Department and other Attorney-Genera's Departments under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Legislation.

By the Departments' direct involvement in the Civil Enforcement of Custody Orders a
system of co-operation has developed between our Department, the Police Department,
the Children's Aid Societies and the Courts with regard to these type of cases. It has been

the experience that providing assistance to foreign custodial parents enables quick

enforcement of Orders as well as the foreign custodial parent not having to incur any
expenses with regard to engaging the services of a private detective or a lawyer in
Manitoba to enforce the legal right of custody. Involving the Crown expedites these
matters by the easy assessability to the Courts and Police Departments, and has resulted

in quick returns of abducted children.
The Attorney General's Department, rather than Legal Aid should be responsible for

enforcement of foreign custody orders. Financial circumstances should not dictate
whether the government of each state becomes involved for purposes of enforcing foreign

custody orders. The urgency of having the matters dealt with as quickly and expediently
as possible dictate that the Crown be involved. Using Legal Aid could involve months of

processing the application. Economics should not be a consideration when the interest of
an abducted child is at stake."
6. See supranote 1.

7. Held in Madison, Wisconsin; April 22-24, 1981.
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In virtually every country the question has to be faced "how far is
the mother's cooperation in locating the father a precondition to
public support being made available to the mother and child."
Federal legislation in the U.S.A., although requiring the mother's
support, provides relatively modest sanctions where the mother will
not cooperate. The mother can keep her children's AFDC benefits
which are then paid to a third person known as the protective payee,
but may lose her own. This contrasts markedly with the Provincial
position in Canada where the mother is required to take proceedings
against her husband or the father of her child as a precondition to
obtaining Family Benefits.8 In Jollimorev. For,City of Halifax,et a,
a man who had successfully resisted such an application sued the City
of Halifax for the cost of blood tests involved in resisting his claim
alleging that the City of Halifax was the real plaintiff in the action.
Although the action was unsuccessful on technical grounds the Court
of Appeal -was far fyom being unmo-ed by the m-As pAight.
Even these few examples (and there are many more) show the
relevance in Canada of American approaches to what are common
social problems in the field of child support transcending national
boundaries. There is scarcely a family lawyer, social worker or
administrator of social security programmes who could not read this
book with advangage.10 The book may even provide a fillip to the
proposals of Myrna Bowman to improve the interprovincial enforcement of Maintenance Orders after Divorce by either utilising the
Federal Courts in this area, adding garnishment powers to the
Divorce Act, or by making the Minister of National Revenue subject
to garishment to collect arrears of mtaittenat ce wit tespect to antxy
refund payable to the taxpayer/maintenance debtor or the "Tentative Proposals for an Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act"
published in March 1982 by the Saskatchewan Law Reform
Commission.
A. Bissett-Johnson
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University

8. See Reg. 15(3), Family Benefits Rep. N.S., No. 178.
9. 7 N.S.L.N. 90.
I0."Practical tools to improve inteprovincial enforcement of maintenance orders after
divorce." Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper (1980).
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Surviving the Breakup - How Children and Parents Cope with
Divorce. By Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan Berlin Kelly. New York:
Basic Books, 1980. Pp. 341. Price: $8.95.
Until recently the position of a mother involved in a battle with the
father for custody of her children was bolstered and fortified by at
least two doctrines: The common law "tender years doctrine",
masquerading as a rule of common sense but applied in some
jursidictions like a rule of law,' and Dr. John Bowley's work on
Maternal Deprivation. 2 Both these tended to support the mother's
claim to custody. If she obtained custody then her decision to deny
her husband or ex-husband access to his children might have been
justified by Goldstein, Solnit and Freud's assertion that whether
access was to take place or not should depend on the decision of the
custodial parent.3 Access could even be terminated if it made the
custodial parent anxious and this was transmitted to the child to his
or her actual or perceived future detriment. 4 Of late, however, con1. See the Saskatchewan Law Reform Commission "Proposalson Custody, Parental
Guardianship, and the Civil Rights of Minors." Commenting on the change made to the
Infants Act of Saskatchewan made in 1978 by s. 4 of the Infants Amendment Act R.S.S.
1978, C.32 (supp.) that in considering applications for custody"no presumption shall exist
as between parents that one parent shall be preferred over the other on account of his or
her status as father or mother." The Commission recognised that this amendment was not.
intended to prevent a court finding, as a matter of fact, that a particular mother was better
suited to have custody of herchild than the child's father. Theamendment was, however,
intended to prevent the use of the tender years doctrine as a rule of common sense in the
absence of actual evidence showing a relationship between parent and chiold. Unfortunately, by characterising the relationship as one of common sense rather than a presumption, the courts in some cases -were apparently still applying the "tender years" dotrine
despite the statutory amendments and the Commission recommended (p. 6) that more
explicit amendments, be made to abolish the tender years doctrine or rule of common
sense.

2. Maternal Care and Mental Health (W.H.O. Monograph Number 2, 1951).
3. Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child"New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1973) at 38. It is true that the authors do not
overtly deny the value of a continuing contact between the child and the non custodial
parent, but, by denying any legally enforceable right of access by the non-custodial parent
they seem to suggest that the more unreasonable for non-custodial parent is over access
the stronger is their hand at law. This appears to confuse the best interests of the parents
with those of the child. However, having raised the issue one must recognise the extremely
limited powers of a court to enforce access orders, and the reluctance of the court to use,
the contempt power, or to change custody. Perhaps in fairly evenly balanced but
competing claims for custody an important criteria is "which parent, if granted custody, is
more likely to allow unimpeded access by the other?"
4. Lavery v. Lavery (1977), 22. N.S.R. (2d) 432 at 441 (para 30). "If, as I find, the
continuing relationship between the child and the respondent causes emotional upset on
the part of the mother of the child, this, undoubtedly, has an effect on the child itself,and
is a factor which I keep in mind, not, as I have said, because the welfare of the mother is of
primary concern, but because anything which disturbs the emotional balance of the

472 The Dalhousie Law Journal

trary views emphasizing the importance of both parents to children
have emerged. Dr. Judith Grief has challenged the inherently
unequal division of power in the traditional sole custody and reasonable access award. 5 To this must be added Wallerstein and Kelly's
recent empirical 'work on how children and parents cope 'with
divorce. This book, which should be required reading for all those
involved in the marriage breakdown process, whether as judges,
lawyers, doctors or social scientists, consists of 17 chapters broken
down into four parts: (i) separation; (ii) parents and children after
separation; (iii) in transition; and (iv) five year follow-up.
The study was based on a small sample, 60 families comprising 121
children 6 and, though the sample might be regarded as unrepresentative by having a "middle class or California bias," its findings are
nevertheless valid even though they challenge many of our comfortable beliefs about divorce. Even if the decision to divorce can be
viewed as rational from an adult perspective, the overwhelming
majority of children preferred the unhappy marriage to divorce
(p. 10) and decried the concept of the painless divorce. The study reveals willingness of parents to see their children's response to the divorce very much from their own point of view. The parent who opted
for divorce tended to see the children as adjusting well to the crisis,
whilst the parent who disapproved of the divorce tended to see the
children as suffering or in crisis (p. 17). This perhaps compliments the
survey in the English periodical"The Woman" in February 1982 which
revealed that adults are now placing their own happiness first in
marriage or the decision to divorce, and hoping their children will
cope with the new situation.
The lack of safety mechanisms, such as the extended family or
counselling, (p. 43) compounded the child's difficulties in dealing
with divorce. Divorce aroused feelings of rejection, of divided loyalties (their relationship with their mother might be endangered if the

mother is bound to have an effect on the child." This principle must be treated with great
caution lest it be taken to mean the more neurotic a custodial parent is the less likely is he
or she to have to allow access or her former partner. For an example of the "domino
effect" in the related area of step parent adoptions see Re Carter(1976) 15 N.S.R. (2d) 181
in which the need for the stepmother to feel less like a surrogate parent was a factor in the
decision to dispense with the natural mother's consent. This decision may have be been
overtaken by the subsequent decisions in Wolfe Cherrault(1978), N.S.R. (2d) 17 (N.S
C.A.) and Stoodley v. Blunden (1980) 17 R.F.L. (2d) 280.
5. J. Grief, "Access: Legal Right or Privilege at the Custodial Parent's Discretion," 3 Can.
J. Fam. L 43.
6. Interviews were conducted at divorce, 18 months later and concluded with a 5 year

follow up interview.
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children visited or retained loyalty to their father (p. 30). The younger
children (under five) often experienced guilt that they might have
contributed to the breakdown, though other, usually older children,
often had both sophisticated and realistic assessment of the causes of
marital breakdown.
The response of the chidren depended, confirming Goldstein,
Solnit and Freud, on the age of the child. Young children regressed or
had macabre fantasies to explain the departure of the absent parent.
Those of young school age yearned for the departed parent,
expressed anger at the custodial mother (as it usually was) and
engaged in fantasies of reconciliation. For children on the threshhold
of adolescence, the nine to twelves, this was an especially vulnerable
time (p. 80). However, even for thirteen to eighteen year olds divorce
created worries about their own future marriages or even triggered
their indulgence in promiscuous behaviour.
The survey deals with the problems of how children come to terms
with the whole process of divorce. This is much more than the single
event of breakdown. It involves chidren being marked off as "his"
and "hers" by their parents and then, having become close to one
parent or the other, finding themselves displaced by a lover or new
found interest, of having to cope with worsening economic conditions, and changed neighbourhoods.
In working through this process the role of the custodial and
non-custodial parent is crucial. Mothers often felt vulnerable and in
need of "mothering" themselves. "I feel like a twelve year old raising
an eight year old" (p. 109). For the custodial parent the quality of
parenting that they offered was affected both by their feelings of
having to be both parents to their child and the need to find a job.
Often what brought them through this difficult period was almost a
transference of roles and recognition in later years that "I would not
have made it but for the children". At the same time the problem of
visits has to be dealt with. The role of the visiting parent is unclear.
Does he (or she) retain the right to enforce discipline? Where are the
visits to take place - an especially important problem with younger
children? What is clear is that things were not so easy for the men as
their former wives may have believed. Over half feared rejection and
to head this off, the fathers were especially generous. Thus, fear
rather than bribery is the explanation for the special treats lavished
on the children which are often criticized by mothers (p. 124).
Perhaps only half of the mothers saw any value in the visits and
one-fifth actually tried to sabotage the visits. Given how depressed
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the fathers often were, their possible guilt feelings, it is perhaps not
surprising to see why these visits often tail off over time.
The factors favouring access were the motivation of all the parties,
the ability of the fathers to deal with the complex logistics of visiting,
their ability to deal with the hostility or capriciousness of their former
spouse and children, and the psychological profile of the men - those
men who were lonely but not guilt ridden and who were psychologically intact. (p. 131). This still does not address the question of the
frequency of access. In the States the norm appears to be twice
monthly visits, but these are influenced more by lawyers' advice to
winning parties than the best interests of the child. At the time of the
initial interviews at least 40% of children were seeing their absent
parent once a week. Where the children were young school aged boys
whose fathers lived close by visits were often taking place two or three
times a week. Just over a quarter of fathers were seeing their children
twice a week and another quarter "infrequently" i.e. less than once a
month. There seemed to be some evidence that fathers visited their
sons more than their daughters. This might have been influenced by
either a feeling that boys needed their fathers more, or the fact that
the fathers feelings towards their daughters were influenced by their
feelings for their ex-wives. These antagonisms between the parents
could reach a point where 15% of children felt their visits were being
ruined by the parents' crossfire. Eighteen months later things had
changed. The girls seem to adjust substantially more quickly than the
boys. The boys were significantly more opposed to the divorce than
the girls and more longed intensely for their fathers. In a quarter of
the children psychopathological feelings, usually depression, were
present. By five years the cases where the outcome was most successful (at all ages of children) were those where there was a close
relationship between the custodial and non-custodial parents. Usually there was a regular pattern of visiting encouraged by the custodial parent. In practice there seems to be a relationship between
access and support even if the courts see these as independent matters
(p. 186). Sixty-eight percent of the fathers were paying child support
regularly, but in about one-fifth of the cases, litigation, often on the
issues of support and access, ensued. Perhaps surprisingly the emotional importance of the non-custodial father to the child did not
diminish over the five years, or with the custodial parent assuming a
greater role in the child's life (p. 307). This must diminish the significance of Goldstein, Solnit and Freud's argument about the need to
reinforce the position of the custodial parent, or any thoughts that a
child has only one psychological parent. Indeed there is evidence in
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the chapter on 'remarriage' that many children are able to have
satisfying relationships with both their fathers and stepfathers and
that each fitted a slightly different slot in the child's feelings, nor was
there confirmation of the expectation of conflict as they dealt with
their father and stepfather in their formative years. The adult parties
were often less able to cope with this duality, and on occasions found
it difficult when a child retained a desire to see his father despite a
deliberate move to another part of the country aimed at cutting the
father out of the child's life (p. 295).
The study reveals divorce as a several stage process in which the
most stressful period is the initial one. After this period the girls seem
to rebound faster than the boys. This is followed by a transitional
period of two to three years, and by the five year mark most of the
marriages had stabilized or entered into a new marriage. The perceptions of children and adults however, differed markedly even after
five years. Thus whilst the adults generally approved of the divorce
over a half of the children did not regard the divorced family as an
improvement on the predivorce family. A third of the children were
still unhappy or angry with their parents. The absent parent was still
an emotionally important figure in the child's life.
The study becomes important in supporting new investigations of
joint custody despite their lack of attraction to the courts. 7 The report
is also important in its suggestion that children below adolescents are
not reliable judges of their own best interests. Unfortunately, with
overstretched social work departments, this does not help courts
desiring good quality reasonably objective home enquiry or home
study reports by the same social workers who had been able to
evaluate both competing homes. It does, however, support the view
that the court should take as active steps as possible to ensure that
access orders are respected. Finally the survey emphasizes the need
for good quality counselling to enable a period to adjust to divorce.
Alas it is not available generally in Canada nor does there seem to be
much hope of creating such schemes in the present economic climate.
The significance of the book is not just in its providing balance to
the more controversial works of Goldstein, Solnit and Freud, 8 but in
7. See for example Baker v. Baker (1979), 8 R.F.L. (2d) 236 (Ont. C.A.), the majority
view of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Krugerv. Kruger (1980), 11 R.F.L. (2d) 52 and
Zwicker v. Morine (1980), 38 N.S.R. (2d) 236. In contrast see Wilson J.A.'s decision in
Kruger;J. D. Payne, "Co-parenting Revisited" in Payne & Begin, Canada: Cases and
Materialson Divorce,Vol. 2 at 40-673, and a number of Prince Edward Island authorities
mentioned by A. Bissett-Johnson in Recent Developments in Family Law F.L.R.
8. Joseph Goldsetin, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, Before the Best Interests of the
Child (New York: Free Press Paperback, 1979).
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its long term follow up. Keeping in touch with even 60 families over
five years in a mobile society like the United States raises tremendous
problems of logistics.
A. Bissett-Johnson
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University

